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Abstract
Is inflation ‘always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon’ or is it fundamentally a
fiscal phenomenon? This article augments a standard monetary model to incorporate
fiscal details and credit market frictions. These ingredients allow for both interpreta-
tions of the inflation process in a financially constrained environment. We find that
adding financial frictions to the model generates important identifying restrictions on
the observed pattern between inflation and measures of financial and fiscal stress, to
the extent that it can overturn existing findings about which monetary-fiscal policy
regime produced the pre-crisis U.S. data.
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1 Introduction
In any dynamic model with nominal government debt, there are two regions of the policy param-
eter space in which monetary and fiscal policy can jointly determine inflation and stabilize debt
[Leeper (1991), Sims (1994), Woodford (1995)]. One region produces active monetary and passive
fiscal policy or regime-M, yielding the conventional paradigm of inflation determination. Regime-
M assigns monetary policy to control inflation by raising nominal interest rate aggressively with
inflation and fiscal policy to stabilize debt by adjusting taxes or spending. A second region con-
sists of passive monetary and active fiscal policy or regime-F, producing the fiscal theory of the
price level. Under regime-F, policy roles are reversed with monetary policy responding weakly to
inflation and fiscal instruments adjusting weakly to government debt. Because these two policy
regimes imply completely different mechanisms for price level determination and therefore starkly
different policy advice, identifying the prevailing regime is a prerequisite to understanding the
macroeconomy and to making good policy choices.
While the popular surplus-debt regressions are subject to potential simultaneity bias that may
produce misleading inferences about the nature of fiscal behavior, testing endeavors based on
general equilibrium models, on the other hand, find nearly uniform statistical support for regime-
M in the pre-crisis U.S. data [Traum and Yang (2011), Leeper and Li (2017)].1 This consensus
emerged even from periods of fiscal stress during which monetary policy appears to lose control
over inflation. Scant attention, however, has been paid to the empirical relevance of financial
frictions in discerning the underlying regime despite the strong comovement between measures
of financial and fiscal stress shown in Figure 1. A natural question is then what are the effects
of credit risk on inflation. The answer hinges on the policy regime.
This article assesses the identification role of credit market imperfections. To that end, we
extend a standard medium-scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model in two
aspects. In particular, we follow Leeper, Traum and Walker (2017) (henceforth, LTW) to fill
in details of the fiscal policy and incorporate credit market frictions as in Christiano, Motto
and Rostagno (2014) (henceforth, CMR). These ingredients allow for a comprehensive study of
monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a financially constrained environment.
Our key findings are twofold. First, adding financial frictions to the model improves the
relative statistical fit of regime-F, to the extent that it can fundamentally alter the regime ranking
found in the literature. Second, the two regimes produce strikingly different inflation dynamics
following a credit crunch. Contrary to regime-M that underlies CMR’s analysis, elevated credit
risk brings forth heightened fiscal uncertainty and inflation through the mechanism that regime-F
emphasizes. The implied pattern between inflation and measures of financial and fiscal stress is
consistent with the empirical evidence in the 1970s and the recent Great Recession.
1The literature on regime-switching monetary and fiscal policy constitutes an exception.
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Figure 1: Financial stress and fiscal stress. Notes: The left and right vertical axes measure the credit
spread (blue dashed line, measured by Baa Corporate Bond Yield over Ten-Year Treasury Constant
Maturity Rate) and the deficit-to-debt ratio (red solid line, measured as in Sims (2011) by primary
deficit as a proportion of lagged market value of privately held debt). Shaded bars indicate recessions
as designated by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
2 The Models
This section briefly outlines the benchmark DSGE model for the subsequent empirical analysis.
A detailed model description and its variants can be found in the Online Appendix. We denote
xˆt  lnpxtq  lnpxq the log-deviation of a variable xt from its steady state x unless otherwise
noted, and consider a log-linear approximation to the model’s equilibrium conditions around the
steady state.
2.1 Households and Firms The economy is populated by a continuum of optimizing house-
holds indexed by j P r0, 1s. Each household j derives utility from real consumption goods Ctpjq
relative to a habit stock, and suffers disutility from the aggregate quantity of a continuum of dif-
ferentiated labor services Ltpjq. They have access to both nominal deposits Dt at banks that pay
a non-contingent gross return Rt in period t 1 and a portfolio of long-term nominal government
bonds Bt with price P
B
t . This general bond portfolio consists of perpetuities with coupons that
decay at the constant rate ρ P r0, 1s. Households receive deposit and bond earnings, labor in-
come, profits from firms, and transfers from entrepreneurs, and pay lump-sum tax net of transfer
Ttpjq to the government. A perfectly competitive labor packer hires a continuum of differentiated
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labor Ltplq indexed by l P r0, 1s, packs them to produce the aggregate labor L
d
t , and sells it to
intermediate goods producers at price Wt. Each household can change the wages Wtplq of only
a fraction of all labor services each period to maximize her expected lifetime utility; wages that
cannot be reoptimized are partially indexed to past inflation.
The production sector consists of firms that produce intermediate and final goods. A perfectly
competitive final goods producer combines the intermediate goods Ytpiq supplied by a continuum
of intermediate goods producers indexed by i P r0, 1s to produce the final goods Yt with price Pt.
Intermediate goods producers are monopolistic competitors and choose the effective capital Ktpiq
at rental rate Rkt and “packed” labor L
d
t piq at wage Wt in perfectly competitive factor markets.
Their production function is subject to a labor-augmenting technological shock At that induces
a stochastic trend to the model. Only a fraction of them can change the prices Ptpiq each period
to maximize their expected discounted future real profits; firms that cannot reoptimize partially
index their prices to past inflation.
2.2 Financial Frictions A perfectly competitive capital goods producer accumulates phys-
ical capital with an investment adjustment cost and sells it to a continuum of entrepreneurs
indexed by e P r0, 1s at price Qkt . Each entrepreneur e combines her net worth Nt1peq with loans
Bdt1peq from banks to acquire K¯t1peq units of physical capital at the end of period t 1, which
are converted into effective capital in period t but subject to an idiosyncratic shock ωtpeq ¥ 0.
Following CMR, we assume that ωtpeq follows a log-normal distribution with mean unity and
refer to σω,t1, the cross-sectional standard deviation of lnωtpeq, as risk shock. Banks can ob-
serve the realization of ωtpeq only by undertaking costly monitoring and will therefore include
a premium in the interest rate on loans to protect themselves against the default risk. The
entrepreneur then chooses a utilization rate of physical capital that incurs some real cost, rents
it to intermediate goods producers at rate Rkt , and sells the undepreciated capital to the capital
goods producer. Her gross nominal return on capital R˜kt is given by
ˆ˜Rkt 
rk
rk   1  δ
rˆkt  
1  δ
rk   1  δ
qˆt  qˆt1   pˆit (2.1)
where rkt  R
k
t {Pt, q
k
t  Q
k
t {Pt, δ is the capital depreciation rate, and pit  Pt{Pt1 is the
inflation rate. Moreover, the expected capital return premium, i.e., the credit spread, fluctuates
with entrepreneurs’ leverage and their riskiness according to
Etr
ˆ˜Rkt 1  Rˆts  ζsp,bpqˆ
k
t  
ˆ¯kt  nˆtq   ζsp,σω σˆω,t (2.2)
where k¯t  K¯t{At, nt  Nt{pPtAtq, and pζsp,b, ζsp,σωq are the elasticities with respect to leverage
and risk. Note that if ζsp,b  0 and σˆω,t  0, financial frictions dissipate and (2.1)–(2.2) reduce
to the familiar arbitrage condition between the return to capital and the risk-free rate.
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2.3 Monetary and Fiscal Policy The central bank implements monetary policy according
to an interest rate rule. It reacts to deviations of inflation and output from their steady states
Rˆt  ρrRˆt1   p1  ρrqpφpipˆit   φyyˆtq   u
r
t (2.3)
where ρr determines the degree of policy smoothing, pφpi, φyq control the responsiveness to in-
flation and output deviations, yt  Yt{At, and u
r
t is a monetary policy shock. The government
collects revenues from net lump-sum tax and sells nominal bond portfolio to finance interest
payments and expenditures. Its flow budget constraint is given by
bt   τt 
1   ρPBt
PBt1
bt1
pit∆t
  gt (2.4)
where bt  P
B
t Bt{pPtYtq, τt  Tt{Yt, and gt  Gt{Yt are expressed in terms of the ratio to output,
and ∆t  Yt{Yt1 is the gross growth rate of output. In what follows, we denote pbˆt, τˆt, gˆtq the
level-deviations of these variables from their steady states, i.e., xˆt  xt  x for x P tb, τ, gu, to
avoid having the percentage change of a percentage.
Fiscal variables, as evinced by Figure 1, are persistent and variable. To capture these features,
we follow Sims (2012) and embed a ‘long-run risk’ type of component into a possibly counter-
cyclical tax rule
τˆt  γ
τ
b bˆt1   γ
τ
y yˆt   u
τ,l
t   u
τ,s
t (2.5)
where pγτb , γ
τ
y q control the responsiveness to deviations of lagged debt and current output. The
tax shock contains both a very persistent long-run component uτ,lt with small variance to capture
the low frequency movement in fiscal variables and a mildly persistent short-run component uτ,st .
Moreover, government consumption follows the rule
gˆt  ρggˆt1  p1  ρgqpγ
g
b bˆt1   γ
g
y yˆtq   u
g
t (2.6)
where ρg measures the degree of policy smoothing, pγ
g
b , γ
g
yq control the responsiveness to devia-
tions of lagged debt and current output, and ugt is a fiscal policy shock. The presence of response
to output deviations in (2.5)–(2.6) renders fiscal instruments automatic stabilizing, which plays
a similar role as LTW’s distorting steady-state taxes. Besides the benchmark specification above
(model 1), we also consider the original model of LTW that allows government consumption to be
valued as a public good (model 2) as well as its lump-sum tax version with automatic stabilizers
(model 3).
The fundamental difference between the two policy regimes lies in their distinct fiscal financing
schemes. We highlight all financing possibilities of government debt that can be gleaned from
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the linearized version of government budget constraint (2.4)
bˆt   pτˆt  gˆtqlooomooon
primary surplus

b
β
pˆit
lomon
surprise inflation
 
bρ
pieγ
PˆB,t
looomooon
bond price

b
β
∆ˆt
lomon
output growth
 
1
β
pbˆt1  bPˆB,t1q
looooooooomooooooooon
predetermined term
(2.7)
where β is the household’s discount factor and γ is the growth rate of At along the steady-
state balanced growth path. (2.7) makes it clear that a fiscal consolidation can be accomplished
through several channels—higher primary surplus, surprise inflation, lower bond price, and higher
output growth—or any of their combinations, regardless of the policy regime in place. In partic-
ular, while regime-M relies primarily on direct taxation, regime-F hinges crucially on the debt
revaluation effects of higher inflation and lower bond price.
3 Regime Comparison
We apply Bayesian methods to estimate each regime-dependent model over two subsamples:
pre-Volcker era, 1962:Q1–1979:Q2; and post-Volcker era, 1984:Q1–2007:Q4.2 The common set
of quarterly observables includes: log differences of private consumption, investment, real wage,
and GDP deflator; log hours worked; federal funds rate and credit spread. In addition, we add
two fiscal variables, i.e., government consumption and real market value of debt, to the dataset:
ratios to GDP for model 1; and log differences for models 2 and 3. See the Online Appendix
for details on the data construction, measurement equations, prior distributions, and posterior
estimates. For comparison purpose, we also remove the spread data and reestimate all models
without financial frictions.
3.1 Marginal Likelihood In the Bayesian paradigm, formal regime comparison and se-
lection can be made possible through marginal likelihoods and Bayes factors. We follow the
multistage framework of Chib and Jeliazkov (2001) that, in conjunction with the tailored ran-
domized block posterior sampler of Chib and Ramamurthy (2010), provides an efficient scheme
for estimating marginal likelihoods in high-dimensional DSGE models, and is immune to the
difficulties with harmonic mean based approaches. Two aspects of the implied Bayes factors
reported in Table 1 are worth highlighting.3
First, in the absence of financial frictions, whereas the post-Vocker sample overwhelmingly fa-
vors regime-M in all models, the pre-Volcker sample remains inconclusive—small perturbations
2Our full sample begins when the spread data first becomes available and ends before the federal funds rate
nearly hit its effective lower bound. To reflect the two policy regimes, we specify two sets of priors on the policy
parameters, each of which places almost all probability mass on regions of the parameter space that deliver unique
model solution consistent with a regime.
3For each case in Table 1, we estimate the marginal likelihood from a 6-stage parallel procedure based on
10,000 posterior draws for each stage. All computations are executed using the MATLAB toolbox developed by
Chib and Tan (2017).
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Table 1: Log Marginal Likelihood Estimates
1962:Q1–1979:Q2 1984:Q1–2007:Q4
Model No FF ln BF   FF ln BF No FF ln BF   FF ln BF
Model 1: Benchmark
Regime-M -700.05 – -621.62 – -660.07 12.67 -535.94 0.82
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.11)
Regime-F -685.13 14.92 -602.82 18.80 -672.74 – -536.76 –
(0.08) (0.11) (0.06) (0.07)
Model 2: LTW   distorting tax
Regime-M -815.49 11.71 -735.32 6.96 -861.51 24.92 -732.56 21.86
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Regime-F -827.20 – -742.28 – -886.43 – -754.42 –
(0.10) (0.08) (0.14) (0.14)
Model 3: LTW   lump-sum tax
Regime-M -839.68 8.95 -756.70 0.88 -867.33 37.92 -735.97 34.69
(0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11)
Regime-F -848.63 – -757.58 – -905.25 – -770.66 –
(0.10) (0.08) (0.13) (0.12)
Notes: Marginal likelihood estimates with numerical standard errors in parentheses and Bayes factors (BF) are
reported in logarithm scale for models 1–3 under each regime both with and without financial frictions (FF).
Asterisk (*) signifies decisive evidence in favor of the regime with superior fit, corresponding to a log Bayes factor
greater than 4.6 based on Jeffreys’ (1961) criterion.
to the fiscal details of the model and data can lead to a reversal of the regime ranking. Impor-
tantly, only model 1, which features a persistent component in the tax rule, identifies the switch
in monetary policy stance that aligns well with the narrative record of policymakers’ beliefs:
the passive stance of most of the 1970s under Federal Reserve chairmen Arthur Burns and G.
William Miller; and the active stance of the early 1980s and beyond under Paul Volcker and Alan
Greenspan. Second, adding financial frictions to the model uniformly improves the relative fit of
regime-F in all cases, to the extent that it can fundamentally alter the regime ranking—regimes
M and F become ‘nearly’ observationally equivalent in model 3 over the pre-Volcker era and,
surprisingly or not, model 1 over the post-Volcker era for which the tenability of regime-M has
rarely been challenged in the literature. This echoes the theoretical demonstration of Leeper and
Walker (2013) that the two regimes can provide equally plausible interpretations of the data.
Taken together, these findings point to a broader message that policymakers should routinely
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Figure 2: Dynamic responses to one percent positive risk shock. Notes: Responses are evaluated at
the posterior modes of regime-M (blue dashed line) and regime-F (red solid line) based on the full
sample. Credit spread, inflation, nominal and real rates are converted into annualized basis points; the
remaining variables are in percentage deviations from steady state.
scrutinize alternative monetary-fiscal policy specifications in their policymaking process.
3.2 Inspecting the Mechanism Observational equivalence of the two regimes may obscure
their strikingly different inflation dynamics following a credit crunch. Figure 2 displays the
dynamic responses of key variables to an adverse risk shock in model 1. Since banks charge a
higher interest rate on loans in response to a rise in risk, the credit extended to entrepreneurs falls.
With fewer financial resources, entrepreneurs purchase less physical capital from the capital goods
producer who in turn acquires fewer investment goods. Under both regimes, falling investment
leads to a drop in output; it also pushes down the price of physical capital and hence the net
worth of entrepreneurs, amplifying the impacts of credit market tensions on the macroeconomy
through the standard financial accelerator.
Turning to the policy reactions to the economic contraction, the monetary authority responds
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by more aggressively cutting the policy rate in regime-M. With sticky prices, a lower nominal
interest rate reduces the real interest rate. As a result, consumption rises by more than that in
regime-F, tempering the short-run drop in output. The automatic stabilizing fiscal instruments,
on the other hand, respond by cutting taxes and increasing expenditures financed by nominal
bond sales. Together with lower output and higher bond price due to lower nominal rate, this
fiscal expansion raises the market value of debt as a share of output in both regimes. Because
higher deficits do not trigger expectations of sufficiently high surpluses to stabilize debt in regime-
F, households feel wealthier and demand more consumption goods, which bids up the price level.
The resulting higher inflation and lower bond price jointly ensure that the market value of debt
is aligned with the expected present value of surpluses. Such wealth effect, if any, will almost
be neutralized by the passive fiscal policy in regime-M so that the decline in economic activity
results in a decline in the marginal cost of production and hence inflation.
Overall, including financial frictions in the model yields an important identifying restriction on
the observed pattern between inflation (Panel F) and measures of financial (Panel A) and fiscal
stress (Panel J). In particular, contrary to regime-M that underlies CMR’s analysis, elevated
credit risk can bring forth fiscal inflation through the debt revaluation channel that regime-
F emphasizes. This pattern clearly accounts for the Great Inflation of the 1970s as well as
the missing deflation during and following the recent Great Recession when the credit market
tightened sharply and large fiscal stimulus plans were implemented, suggesting that regime-F
has prevailed in those periods.
4 Concluding Remarks
This article studies monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a financially constrained environ-
ment. We estimate various versions of a standard medium-sized DSGE model augmented with
fiscal details and credit market imperfections, and find that adding financial frictions to the
model plays an important role in improving the relative fit of regime-F that embodies the fiscal
theory. The improvement stems largely from regime-F’s implications for the inflation dynam-
ics following a credit crunch, which find empirical support in some historical periods. Further
identifying restrictions from elsewhere, however, are necessary to break the near observational
equivalence of the two regimes found in the present study.
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